

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 KINSHA 07583 101602Z

43

ACTION AF-04

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

PM-03 DODE-00 SP-02 OMB-01 MC-01 TRSE-00 IGA-01 EB-03

/040 W

----- 059459

P 101445Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9520

S E C R E T KINSHASA 7583

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: MASS PFOR CG

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ZAIRE

REF: (A) STATE 214399; (B) KINSHASA 7197; (C) SECDEF CONFIDENTIAL  
MESSAGE 4676 DTG 122204Z AUG 76; (D) DAO KIN 021500Z JUL 76;  
(E) STATE 221179

1. AT THE RISK OF REPEATING A POINT WE'VE MADE BEFORE, I MUST  
REITERATE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS WITH RESPECT TO OUR OVER-ALL  
RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE THAT WE MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY WITH A CREDIBLE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

2. THROUGHOUT THE YEAR WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SIGNED TO MOBUTU --  
VIA HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, GENERAL ROCKWELL'S MISSION, PUBLIC  
STATEMENTS -- OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HIS INCREASED SECURITY NEEDS  
AND OUR INTENTION TO HELP OUT. MOBUTU HAS APPRECIATED OUR  
ASSURANCES AND, IN TURN, HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS READINESS TO  
COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH US IN OTHER FIELDS AS WELL: HE HAS, FOR  
EXAMPLE, GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO OPPOSE RADICALS ON KEY ISSUES  
OF INTEREST TO US IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS (NAC, UNGA) AND IS  
CURRENTLY SUPPORTING THE SECRETARY'S INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN  
AFRICA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 KINSHA 07583 101602Z

3. FOR ONE WHO VALUES HIS CREDENTIALS AS AN AFRICAN LEADER,

MOBUTU'S STRONG SUPPORT OF -- AND CONSEQUENT IDENTIFICATION WITH -- THE US IS NOT WITHOUT POLITICAL RISKS. I BELIEVE HE IS WILLING TO CONTINUE TO TAKE SUCH RISKS ONLY SO LONG AS WE ARE RESPONSIVE TO WHAT HE VIEWS AS ZAIRE'S PRESSING NEEDS. AND NOTHING HAS HIGHER PRIORITY ON MOBUTU'S LIST THAN STRENGTHENING HIS DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT TO OFFSET THE HEAVIER, MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS HE NOW FACES ACROSS HIS BORDERS IN ANGOLA AND CONGO. UNLESS WE ARE VERY SOON ABLE TO FOLLOW UP OUR MANY WORDS WITH TRULY CREDIBLE ACTION IN THE SECURITY FIELD, I AM PERSUADED MOBUTU WILL BE INCLINED TO REASSESS THE UTILITY OF CONTINUING ZAIRE'S CLOSE COOPERATION WITH US IN OTHER IMPORTANT AREAS OF OUR RELATIONS.

4. IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WE REMAIN CONCERNED THAT OUR PLANNING STILL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN IMPACT OF THE DIMENSION REQUIRED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE LATEST PROPOSAL WE HAVE SEEN, IN BRIEFING DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN REF (E), CALLS FOR ONE TANK PLATOON OF THREE TANKS IN A 36-48 MONTH TIME FRAME AND IN ADDITION SEVEN TANKS IN A 48-60 MONTH TIME FRAME. IT IS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO MOBUTU. IN CONSEQUENCE, WE REITERATE OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT WE OFFER TWO ALTERNATIVE PACKAGES TO MOBUTU, ONE WHICH WOULD ESSENTIALLY BE THE ROCKWELL IMPACT PACKAGE AND THE OTHER A REFORMULATED VERSION OF THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF (A).

5. AGAIN LOOKING AT \$40 MILLION AS THE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE FROM TRANSITIONAL QUARTER AND FY 77 MONIES, THE ROCKWELL IMPACT PACKAGE MUST BE MODIFIED TO ALLOW FOR A RESIDUAL OF APPROXIMATELY \$5 MILLION TO COVER SPARES, MAINTENANCE, TRAINING, ETC. FOR THE ONGOING C-130 PROGRAM. ONE WAY OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS COULD BE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS IN THE ROCKWELL IMPACT PACKAGE BY APPROXIMATELY HALF. CUTBACKS IN OTHER AREAS COULD ACCOMPLISH THE SAME PURPOSE, BUT THE TANK COMPONENT SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS PROPOSAL MEANS DIVERTING M-60S FROM OTHER BUYERS BUT WE FIRMLY RECOMMEND SO DOING.

6. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE BASED ON THE PACKAGE AND TIMING CONTAINED IN REF (A), BUT SHOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TANKS TO 20, WITH FOUR BEING DELIVERED EVERY SIX MONTHS BEGINNING WITH MONTH 12 OF THE PROGRAM. IT ALSO OCCURS TO US THAT THE TANK  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 KINSHA 07583 101602Z

RETRIEVER SHOULD ARRIVE WITH THE FIRST SHIPMENT. IN ADDITION, HELICOPTERS SHOULD BE PART OF THIS OPTION. BOTH MOBUTU AND GEN. BABIA HAVE STRESSED THEIR COUNTRY'S URGENT NEED FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT. WE RECOMMEND THAT WHEN WE PRESENT THIS PACKAGE WE INCLUDE HELICOPTERS AT A SPECIFIC POINT IN THE FUTURE. LASTLY, THE NEED FOR HOLDING BACK APPROXIMATELY \$5 MILLION FOR THE ONGOING C-130 PROGRAM APPLIES TO THIS OPTION AS WELL.

7. I REALIZE THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ENTAIL. HOWEVER, I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT AT THIS CRITICAL PERIOD IN US RELATIONS WITH AFRICA OUR POLITICAL AS WELL AS OTHER INTERESTS IN ZAIRE MERIT A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH PRIORITY TO OUR PROGRAM HERE TO PERMIT MOVING AHEAD WITH EARLIER DELIVERY OF TANKS AND HELICOPTERS THAN OUR PRESENT PLANNING ENVISAGES. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT WE HAVE TURNED ASIDE MOBUTU'S REPEATED REQUESTS FOR ALL KINDS OF EXPENSIVE AND SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT RANGING FROM AIR DEFENSE MISSILES TO JET COMBAT AIRCRAFT. I THINK IN MOST CASES WE WERE RIGHT IN DOING SO. BUT I ALSO BELIEVE WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSED ABOVE IS THE MINIMUM WE CAN OFFER WHILE STILL MAINTAINING OUR CREDIBILITY IN MOBUTU'S EYES AND THE FAVORABLE MOMENTUM WE HAVE DEVELOPED IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

CUTLER

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, POLITICAL PATRONAGE  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 10 SEP 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** blochd0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976KINSHA07583  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760342-0748  
**From:** KINSHASA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760974/aaaacktu.tel  
**Line Count:** 130  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION AF  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** 76 STATE 214399, 76 KINSHASA 7197  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** blochd0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 09 MAR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <09 MAR 2004 by morefirh>; APPROVED <02 NOV 2004 by blochd0>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ZAIRE  
**TAGS:** MASS, PFOR, CG, US, (MOBUTU SESE SEKO)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006